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Abstract
On November 18, 2020, the National Communications Commission (NCC) 
revoked the application of cable news station Chung Tien TV (CTiTV) to 
renew its broadcasting license.1 This decision triggered supporters of this 
television channel, mostly pan-Blue voters, to protest and rally. One man 
self-immolated to express his support for CTiTV.2 This act aimed to copy a 
prodemocracy figure, Cheng Nan-jung, an editor of China News Analysis 
Freedom Era Weekly, who, on April 7, 1989, burned himself to death to 
defend press freedom. After losing its license, CTiTV subsequently accused 
the Taiwanese government of infringing press freedom through the NCC’s 
decision-making body.3
Taiwan’s people have fought for democracy since the 1980s; indeed, press 
freedom has been one of the cornerstones for which they have been fighting. 
Between 1996 and 2020, Taiwan experienced three shifts in governmental 
power. The question arises: Has the Taiwanese government censored cable 
television channels, forgetting how press freedom was earned over this long 
and hard process? 
This essay aims to clarify the situation first by reviewing the theoretical 
discussion of press regulation and public interest. By addressing the public 
interest, the study enters the debate about elitism and populism. Following this 
conceptual discussion, the study focuses on the case of CTiTV, particularly 
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regarding this TV channel’s promotion of a populist figure, Han Kuo-yu, 
during his runs in both the mayoral election in Kaohsiung in 2018 and the 
presidential election in 2020. The concluding analysis revisits the essay’s core 
question: Does press freedom come with an obligation regarding fulfillment 
of responsibility? The discussion aims to generate more reflection by scholars 
and students in media studies, politics, and governance.
Keywords:  CTiTV, Han Kuo-yu, National Communications Commission 
(NCC), populism, press freedom.
 
During the past few years, Taiwan has witnessed the sudden rise and fall of 
a conservative populist. Han Kuo-yu, an underdog from the pro-unification 
Nationalist Party, the Kuomintang (KMT), won a mayoral election and ran 
in the 2020 presidential election. Like populists in other countries, the rise of 
Han as a candidate was facilitated by the media. However, while the former 
presidential candidate made bold promises and aroused social concerns, media 
professionals, citizens, and citizen groups launched fact-checking projects to 
examine the words and deeds of the populist. Han experienced a setback in 
the presidential election, and the populist wave subsided. On June 6, 2020, 
Han even lost his position as Kaohsiung’s mayor; according to the Kaohsiung 
election commission, 939,030 people-a number way above the threshold of 
570,000 for ousting a mayor4-voted for his removal, with only 25,051 voting 
for his retention in office. 
This essay explores the media’s involvement in the Han wave, especially 
regarding the licensed television outlet, Chung Tien TV (in Chinese; hereafter 
referred to as CTiTV). There are two reasons why this study targets CTiTV as 
the main media source that was responsible for the Han wave.
First, CTiTV has been called Han Tien TV, meaning the flagship news 
outlet for the Han wave. CTiTV belongs to the pro-China Want Want Group. 
It consists of several news media outlets, including two daily newspapers, 
China Times and Business Daily, one terrestrial television station (China TV), 
and, formerly, one twenty-four-hour cable news channel. CTiTV was one of 
the eleven twenty-four-hour cable news channels in Taiwan, among which it 
was the most influential. CTiTV occupied an important slot (channel number 
52) in major cable television systems; cable TV (compared with terrestrial TV) 
is the most dominant news media in Taiwan. During the Kaohsiung mayoral 
4 Lawrence Chung, “Taiwan Opposition Candidate Removed as Mayor in Recall Vote,” South 
China Morning Post (June 6, 2020), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3087861/
taiwan-opposition-candidate-han-kuo-yu-removed-mayor-kaohsiung (accessed June 8, 2020).
July 2021  |  121
election, between November 17, 2018, and November 23, 2018, CTiTV devoted 
62 percent of its news time to the KMT presidential candidate, Han Kuo-yu.5 
CTiTV presented Han as a populist figure, sensationalizing the sufferings of 
ordinary people, and portraying the ruling party as having betrayed the people. 
By such stylistic news framing, CTiTV nurtured a group of fans for Han as well 
as for CTiTV itself, as CTiTV’s rating climbed during that period. CTiTV is a 
critical case that demonstrates how the media has helped to promote populism. 
Second, cable TV is the dominant media source for Taiwanese audiences. 
Statistically, the share of cable TV in Taiwan’s households increased from 
79.9 percent to 86.1 percent between 2007 and 2018.6 CTiTV occupied 
channel 52 in the news block (channels 49 to 58). This range of channels is 
deemed the most valuable, as the country’s cable subscribers consistently 
watch the news in this block. More than 85 percent of the households in Taiwan 
receive cable TV. Thus, given the popularity of channel 52 among Taiwan’s 
cable TV channels, the influence of CTiTV’s broadcasting was significant.
More controversial developments related to CTiTV occurred after Han was 
recalled in June 2020. On November 18, 2020, the National Communications 
Commission (NCC) revoked CTiTV’s broadcasting license. Supporters of 
CTiTV protested and rallied in front of the presidential palace demanding 
press freedom. A seventy-year-old man burned himself to express his support 
for press freedom.7 This action aimed to recreate the scene back in 1989, when 
a prodemocracy fighter, Cheng Nan-jung, an editor of China News Analysis 
Freedom Era Weekly, died from self-immolation in support of press freedom. 
This essay attempts to answer a core question: Does press freedom come 
with an obligation to fulfill responsibility? The case study presents the rise 
and fall of CTiTV and the Han wave. The essay has five sections. The first 
provides a brief review of conceptual and theoretical frameworks and has 
two subsections, one of which reviews the media’s role in serving the public 
interest and the regulation of Taiwan’s media. The second subsection addresses 
the link between the media and the rise of populism. The second and third 
main sections of the essay provide the background of the rise and fall of Han 
and CTiTV. In the fourth section, two important questions are addressed: 
How can we understand press freedom? Does press freedom also demand 
accountability? The fifth and last section of the essay provides a summary 
discussion and conclusion. 
5 National Communications Commission, “Content Analysis of Television News Coverage for the 
2018 Local Election in Taiwan: Commissioned by the NCC” (June 19, 2019), https://www.ncc.
gov.tw/chinese/files/19060/8_41512_190605_1.pdf (accessed March 5, 2021).
6 “Taiwan: Share of Households with Cable Television Sets,” Statista (2020), https://www.
statista.com/statistics/324742/taiwan-share-of-households-with-cable-television-sets/ (accessed 
December 9, 2020). 
7 Everington, “Taiwanese Man Self Immolates to Protest Closure of Pro-China CTI News.”
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Theoretical and Conceptual Frameworks
Media and Public Interest
In any democratic society, freedom of speech is the bellwether of democratic 
principles. The prevailing principle of media law indicates, “Freedom of speech 
may be regarded as the most fundamental right which everyone should enjoy 
in a liberal society.”8 Freedom of speech is the universal goal of consolidating 
democracy in Taiwan. Gary and Ming-Yeh Rawnsley detailed the media’s 
role in Taiwan’s regime transition.9 They indicated that, although there was 
consolidation of democratization in Taiwan, the media’s liberalization did 
not provide a universal panacea. In the 1990s, the print media and cable TV 
still were mainly controlled by the governing political party, the Kuomintang. 
The fight for freedom of speech, therefore, evolved into a demand for press 
freedom. It was and still is taboo in Taiwan for the political ruling party to try 
to control, influence, or intervene in such freedom.
However, there is an important question: Is freedom of speech equal to 
freedom of the press? As noted, here, these two freedoms are not the same: 
I believe that we have misunderstood what a modern 
democratic society’s commitment to freedom of the 
press means and should be. Unlike freedom of speech, to 
certain aspects of which our commitment must be virtually 
unconditional, freedom of the press should be contingent on 
the degree to which it promotes certain values at the core of 
our interest in freedom of expression generally. Freedom of 
the press, in other words, is an instrumental good: It is good if 
it does certain things and not especially good (not good enough 
to justify special protections) otherwise. If, for example, the 
mass media tend to suppress diversity and impoverish public 
debate, the arguments meant to support freedom of the press 
turn against it, and we may rightly consider regulating the 
media to achieve the ultimate purposes of freedom of the 
press (emphasis added).10
Freedom of speech and freedom of the press are not on the same page 
because media owners often are not ordinary citizens. They frequently are 
entrepreneurs with large amounts of financial or political capital; in some 
8 Eric Barendt, Lesley Hitchens, and Rachael Craufurd-Smith, Media Law: Text, Cases and 
Materials, 1st ed. (Harlow: Pearson, 2014).
9 Gary D. Rawnsley and Ming-Yeh T. Rawnsley, “Regime Transition and the Media in Taiwan,” 
Democratization 5, no. 2 (June 1, 1998): 113.
10 Judith Lichtenberg, “Foundation and Limits of Freedom of the Press,” in Democracy and the 
Mass Media: A Collection of Essays, ed. Judith Lichtenberg (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990), 104.
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cases, they are equipped with both. In a democratic society, if the government’s 
control of the press is negated, these media owners likely are corporation owners 
whose concern is making profits. The tension, therefore, concerns the right of 
media owners to make profits versus their obligation to be guardians of the 
public interest. Media in a democratic society are supposedly the government’s 
watchdogs. However, since the media, no matter in which form, tend to be 
owned by private corporations, it is difficult to distinguish the vested interests 
such media apparatuses serve-corporate or public interest.11 If the media are 
the government’s watchdogs, who scrutinizes the media? The answer is the 
public interest, which should be the paramount benchmark for the media to 
apply on what and how to report. Still, this raises important questions: How 
do we define public interest? Should such a definition encompass competition 
and diversity? Or should the understanding of public interest be defined by 
the principle of “supply and demand”?12 If the answer is the latter, the public 
interest is served by unregulated, profit-seeking media that aim to satisfy 
public desires. 
Should the government be able to intervene in such matters? The 
fundamental question is not whether the government should intervene, but 
how, as the media not only form a profit-making platform, but also shoulder 
social responsibility to serve the public interest.13 Diversity of media content is 
essential to ensuring representation of the broad public interest.14 Nevertheless, 
in light of the demand for “press freedom,” to argue that the media should be 
regulated is almost tantamount to support for an authoritarian society. 
As press freedom derives from the notion of individual rights, it is viewed 
as offering concrete benefits to society and its members. Freedom of the press 
consists of two levels of freedom. One is the individual freedom of the owners 
from any mechanism of censorship. The other is the citizenry’s collective 
freedom to be well-informed and to have access to a diverse array of sources 
and viewpoints.15 A central paradox in media policy is to what extent speech 
rights should be oriented around the rights of the individual versus the rights 
of the public.16 Hence, in democratic societies, one of the aims of media 
regulations is to protect speakers’ freedom. However, while there is widely 
shared agreement that mass media has considerable potential for good or ill, 
media regulations are required to restrict publishers’ rights to protect the public 
from possible harm and to promote diversity of sources, content, and so on.17
11 David Croteau and William Hoynes, The Business of Media: Corporate Media and the Public 
Interest (London: Pine Forge Press, 2006).
12 Ibid., 65-71.
13 Denis McQuail, Media Performance (London: Sage, 1992), and Philip M. Napoli, Foundations 
of Communications Policy: Principles and Process in the Regulation of Electronic Media 
(Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, 2001).
14 Barendt, Hitchens, and Craufurd-Smith, Media Law, 18.
15 McQuail, Media Performance, 69.
16 Napoli, Foundations of Communications Policy.
17 McQuail, Media Performance, 70.
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The described tension between the rights of the individual versus those 
of the public is particularly well-illustrated by the regulation of television. 
Television has been more regulated than the print media. Moreover, television 
stations do not enjoy the degree of freedom of publication that is granted to 
the print media.18 Traditionally, the broadcasting media have had the fewest 
resources within the media spectrum. Thus, there are arguments for managing 
national media resources efficiently and in an equitable manner.19 Also, 
television has been considered a great influence on society regarding the 
morals of the young, public decency, and the equity of political discussions. 
Even with the introduction of cable and satellite transmission, it is argued that 
market competition is inefficient regarding the provision of services that the 
public needs.20
Hence, television operators have been subject to strong public regulation 
of operation and content.21 The state or a regulatory body licenses the operators 
for a limited period, and the licenses carry some conditions and requirements 
that form part of the regulatory framework. The regulations are designed 
to ensure that the communication needs of the public are adequately met. 
However, to reduce the possibility of direct regulation from a regulatory body, 
some broadcasters have developed mechanisms for self-regulation. These 
include codes concerning professional norms and ethics that specify conduct 
that should not be breached for personal or commercial gain.22
The Role of Media and the Rise of Populism 
Suppose we accept that the media should reflect diversity and competition, 
which are at the core of public interest. In this case, we must acknowledge that 
both elitism and populism can arise under the principle of diversity.23
In explaining its rise, early literature linked populism to certain socio-
economic and political conditions such as mass society, economic recession, 
and political scandal.24 However, from an ideological approach, populism 
consists of appeals to the entire political community as the “pure people” 




21 The broadcasting model can assume either a public service or a regulated commercial form. 
In the public service variant, the broadcasters are supposed to deliver commercial benefits, 
which are thought to be in the public interest. In the commercial case, there may be editorial 
obligations to society as requirements of operation. See McQuail, Media Performance, 105.
22 Ibid., 522.
23 Croteau and Hoynes, The Business of Media, 156-157.
24 Kirk Hawkins, Madeleine Read, and Teun Pauwels, “Populism and Its Causes,” in 
The Oxford Handbook of Populism, ed. Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul A. Taggart, 
Paulina Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 267-286.
25 Cas Mudde, “The Populist Zeitgeist,” Government and Opposition 39, no. 4 (2004): 541-563, 
and Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason (London: Verso Books, 2005).
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want to deliver their populist appeals (we, the pure people, versus the corrupt 
elites), they need to use the media because of its importance in modern society. 
Hence, over the last decade, growing attention has been paid to the media’s 
role in the success of populism. 
There are two main strands of literature concerning the media and 
populism. The first attributes the diffusion and success of populism to the 
logic of commercial media. Gianpietro Mazzoleni coined the term “media 
populism” to describe “the close connections between media-originated 
dynamics and the rise of populist sentiment.”26 According to Mazzoleni27 and 
others,28 tabloid newspapers and television channels tend to favor sensational 
and controversial content; populist discourses are considered to fit this media 
culture, which prefers sensationalism over rational debates. Moreover, 
politicians who articulate populist discourse can increase visibility in the 
tabloid media. For example, Fox News has covered the Tea Party’s activities, 
delivered its populist claims, and even helped to mobilize populist support.29 
Although the elite media (such as the New York Times) have gained growth in 
subscriptions from the antipopulist camp and adopted an antipopulist editorial 
stance, for example, by calling Trump a “liar,” they have failed to read the 
minds of the populists’ supporters (such as the Tea Party), and therefore have 
underestimated the support of populist figures.30
The second strand of literature focuses on how political actors convey 
populist discourse directly to the public via online social media. The populist 
discourse is supposed to fit the culture of online communications. According 
to Paolo Gerbaudo, social media provides a space for mass networking and 
individuals to gather and form partisan online crowds.31 Sven Engesser et al. 
pointed out that social media provides a platform for populist themes such as 
“advocating for the people and attacking the elites.”32 Because of the nature of 
social media, populist politicians attempt to make the most of these platforms 
26 Gianpietro Mazzoleni, “Populism and Media,” in Twenty-First Century Populism the Spectre 
of Western European Democracy, ed. Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 49-64.
27 Ibid.
28 Simon Cross, “Mad and Bad Media: Populism and Pathology in the British Tabloids,” 
European Journal of Communication 29, no. 2 (2014): 204-217, and Luca Manucci, “Populism 
and the Media,” in The Oxford Handbook of Populism, ed. Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, 
Paul A. Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2017), 467-488.
29 Olivier Jutel, “American Populism and the New Political Economy of the Media Field,” The 
Political Economy of Communication 1, no. 1 (May 16, 2013): 26-42.
30 Des Freedman, “Populism and Media Policy Failure,” European Journal of Communication 33, 
no. 6 (December 1, 2018): 604-605.
31 Paolo Gerbaudo, “Social Media and Populism: An Elective Affinity?” Media, Culture & Society 
40, no. 5 (July 1, 2018): 745-753.
32 Sven Engesser et al., “Populism and Social Media: How Politicians Spread a Fragmented 
Ideology,’” Information, Communication & Society 20, no. 8 (August 3, 2017): 1109-1126.
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to mobilize support and convey consistent political slogans and themes. 
For example, when running for the presidency of the United States in 2016, 
Donald Trump made extensive use of the microblogging platform, Twitter, to 
exploit an incendiary and “straight-talking” public persona.33
The mentioned literature on media populism sheds light on the sudden 
rise of populist politicians discussed in this case study. As the literature has 
shown, commercial media-in need of gaining viewership and attracting 
advertising-have a special preference for sensationalism and tend to privilege 
populist actors. Even the antipopulist elite media need to cover these populists. 
Therefore, populist politicians can cater to the tastes or needs of commercial 
media. In the present study, Han’s emotional tone and simplified binary 
opposition fit commercial media’s disposition in Taiwan. Therefore, after 
the pro-Blue television channels (e.g., CTiTV) gave Han huge coverage and 
gained ratings, the pro-Green channels had to follow suit. 
However, the existing studies belong to linear models. Previous studies 
of media populism mainly ask how political and media actors generate 
populist discourse through channels and audiences.34 Thus, media populism 
is conceived as an integrated system, and the audience has no way to escape. 
Studies have largely ignored the factor of civil society organizations, which 
might have responded to media populism effectively. 
Civil society organizations can be important agents for or against populist 
forces. Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser has developed a framework for the study 
of populist responses.35 In this framework, at the domestic level-in addition 
to political actors (political parties and government agencies)-civil society 
organizations that articulate their citizenry’s preferences can support or oppose 
populist forces. Furthermore, while foreign governments can form alliances 
with domestic populist actors at the international level, transnational civil 
society actors also can play a significant role in responding to domestic populist 
forces by supporting domestic civil society organizations.36
The Media Environment: CTiTV
Based on the first strand of the literature, one can argue that there is more 
need for the regulation of cable television than of print media because there is 
easier accessibility to telecommunications media, and it has greater influence 
on the public. Thus, because of the easier accessibility and greater influence of 
33 Michael Higgins and Angela Smith, Belligerent Broadcasting: Synthetic Argument in Broadcast 
Talk (London: Routledge, 2017).
34 Manucci, “Populism and the Media,” 468.
35 Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, “Populism and the Question of How to Respond to It,” in 
The Oxford Handbook of Populism, ed. Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul A. Taggart, 
Paulina Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 489-507.
36 Ibid.
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television, television channels are more valuable than print media in terms of 
advertisement. Regarding conceptual discussion, if we consider the literature’s 
second strand, it is not surprising that television is the most desirable media for 
the promotion of populism.
The above logic leads us to this essay’s case discussion. CTiTV was one of 
the main driving forces of the Han wave. Even before the rise of the Han wave, 
CTiTV had long triggered doubts, resistance, and protest among Taiwan’s 
NGO groups because its ownership had influenced media performance. 
CTiTV, a twenty-four-hour news channel, belonged to the owner of the 
Want Want Group, Tsai Eng-ming. In 1992, Tsai went to China to start a 
biscuit business and made a fortune by benefiting from favors extended by 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In 2006, Tsai returned to Taiwan to 
buy Taiwanese media to gain more support from the CCP, which sought to 
influence Taiwanese politics. In 2006, Tsai acquired a terrestrial channel, CTV, 
and in 2008, the China Times and CTiTV, the latter being one of the seven 
twenty-four-hour satellite news channels in Taiwan’s cable system. Thereafter, 
the Want Want Group became pro-KMT and pro-CCP, even at the cost of 
triggering the anger of Taiwanese society. For example, while Tsai attempted 
to purchase the main multiple system operation (MSO) in Taiwan in 2012, 
his pro-China remark, “Not that many people could really have died in the 
Tiananmen Square accident,” triggered the biggest media reform movement 
against this media merge.37 CTiTV still maintains its pro-CCP policy, even at 
the cost of the distrust of Taiwan’s civil society. 
CTiTV tensions with Taiwan’s civil society, such as during the Sunflower 
Movement, continued. Beginning on March 19, 2014, student groups occupied 
Taiwan’s legislature for at least one month in their protest against a Chinese trade 
deal. They accused the KMT government of forcing the trade measure without 
reviewing the terms of the agreement. They feared that the agreement would 
give Beijing too much influence over the island’s economy.38 Demonstrators 
also protested against CTiTV, displaying the posters and stickers that it used. 
They argued that the company portrayed the Sunflower Movement in a false 
light.39 Some of them protested outside CTiTV’s headquarters, accusing it of 
producing biased reports about the movement.40
37 Lihyun Lin and Chun-Yi Lee, “When Business Met Politics: The Case of Want Want, a Different 
Type of Media Capital in Taiwan,” China Perspectives, no. 2 (June 1, 2017): 37-46.
38 Austin Ramzy, “Anger Grows in Taiwan against Deal with China,” New York Times (March 23, 
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/24/world/asia/anger-grows-in-taiwan-against-deal-
with-china.html (accessed March 6, 2021).
39 Enru Lin, “The Sunflower Movement, Brought to You by the Internet,” Taipei Times 
(April 3, 2014), https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/feat/archives/2014/04/03/2003587148 
(accessed March 3, 2021).
40 Lok-Sin Loa, “March Accuses CtiTV of Biased Reports,” Taipei Times (April 10, 2014), https:// 
www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2014/04/10/2003587684 (accessed March 3, 2021).
128  |  Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 17, No. 1
Some of CTiTV’s talk shows upset many viewers, who filed complaints 
with the NCC in April 2014. In the program News Tornado, a regular guest, 
Peng Hua-gan, commented on the appearance of two female participants. One 
of the women wore a “provocative” low-cut shirt, hot pants, and thigh-high 
boots, which he said made her look “super-hot.” He then moved his hands 
over a photograph of the woman to suggest that he was unbuttoning her shirt. 
Rather than stopping Peng from making further comments, the show’s host, 
James Tai, encouraged the conversation. In response, an independent content 
review committee viewed the episode. Of the nineteen committee members, 
sixteen voted to reprimand the channel, and three voted to notify the channel 
to address the situation. The NCC commissioners affirmed the penalty 
recommended by the review committee, which was to fine CTiTV NT$500,000 
for violating the Satellite Broadcasting Act by airing content that disrupted 
public order or adversely affected good social customs and norms.41
Because of CTiTV’s performance and tension with civil society, in 2014, 
NGO groups did not approve CTiTV’s renewal of a license. According to 
the satellite broadcasting act, channel operators should obtain a license from 
the regulator, the NCC, and renew it every six years. An external committee 
(composed of scholars, NGO groups, and professional groups) issues the 
primary verdict, while the NCC committee makes the final decision. CTiTV 
applied for a review of its license in 2014. Representatives of the media 
reform groups serving on the external committee argued that the NCC should 
not renew the license, as CTiTV had broadcast derogatory comments about 
female participants in the Sunflower Movement. Despite the disapproval of the 
external committee, the NCC-in consideration of press freedom-approved 
the renewal in 2014, with the requirement that CTiTV must strengthen its 
internal quality-control mechanisms as CTiTV had promised to do during the 
renewal process. Later, CTiTV brought prominence to Han and gave continuous 
coverage to him. It devoted 62 percent of its news time to Han after he declared 
that he was joining the mayoral election. In supporting Han, CTiTV spread 
misinformation in its news coverage. For example, it ran a report about Han’s 
campaign rally, saying that a “Phoenix Spreads Its Wings Like a Cloud” over 
the sky. The NCC ruled that this news story breached the principle of fact 
verification, representing a violation of article 27 of the Satellite Broadcasting 
Act. The commission fined the news agency NT$400,000.42
Other CTiTV stories depicted the ruling Democratic Progressive Party 
(DPP) as a corrupt, elite party whose misadministration had sacrificed ordinary 
41 Shelley Shan, “CtiTV Gets Fine for Women Comments,” Taipei Times (April 17, 2014), https://
www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2014/04/17/2003588245 (accessed December 8, 
2020).
42 Keoni Everington, “Taiwan’s NCC Fines CTiTV for Having 50% of Headlines About Han 
Kuo-Yu,” Taiwan News (March 28, 2019), https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3667786 
(accessed December 9, 2020).
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people’s interests and lost people’s hearts. For example, during CTiTV’s show, 
Political Gossip (大政治大爆卦), the host interviewed a pomelo farmer. The 
farmer said that the price of pomelo was so low the previous year that two 
million tons of the fruit had to be dumped into the Zengwen Reservoir (曾文水
庫). Furthermore, other farmers standing near the interviewee claimed that they 
had not received the subsidies for which they had applied. According to the 
NCC, the host turned the interviewees’ statements into a “news report” without 
verifying the information’s authenticity.43 The way that CTiTV reported these 
random opinions without providing professional journalistic review and 
verification correlates with Christina Peter’s44 argument that strong populist 
beliefs will rely on such opinions in place of professional journalistic reporting. 
In another example, CTiTV broadcast a report implying that Representative to 
Singapore Francis Liang (梁國新) monitored Han’s movements during a trip 
to Singapore and made reports about him to the DPP-led government. CTiTV 
was fined NT $ 600,000 for again violating article 27 of the Satellite Broadcast 
Act, failing to fact-check its news reporting.45
Who Is Han Kuo-yu?
The previous section explains how CTiTV promoted Han by using fake 
sources and erroneous data. Nevertheless, the main framework of these CTiTV 
new stories was populism: “a pure people” against unresponsive and corrupt 
elites. Let us now focus on Han’s rise. According to a study commissioned 
by the NCC, during the Kaohsiung mayoral election, between November 17, 
2018, and November 23, 2018, CTiTV devoted 62 percent of its news time to 
coverage of the KMT presidential candidate, Han Kuo-yu.46
Before 2018, few people had heard of Han. He started his political career 
in 1990 as a Taipei city councilor. He then joined Taiwan’s first democratic 
legislative election in 1993 under the Kuomintang.47 Han was elected three 
times between 1993 and 2002. As a legislator, his constituency always was in 
Taipei County. In 2012, Han became the president of the Taipei Agricultural 
43 Shelley Shan, “CtiTV Penalized Another NT$1m for Pomelo Story,” Taipei Times (April 11, 
2019), https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2019/04/11/2003713194 (accessed 
March 3, 2021).
44 Christina Peter, “The People’s Voice-the People’s Choice? How Vox Pop Exemplars Shape 
Audience Judgments as a Function of Populist Attitudes,” Journalism & Mass Communication 
Quarterly 96, no. 4 (2019): 1004-1024.
45 Everington, “Taiwan’s NCC Fines CTiTV for Having 50% of Headlines About Han Kuo-Yu.” 
46 National Communications Commission, “Content Analysis of Television News Coverage for 
the 2018 Local Election in Taiwan.”
47 Hisang Yu and Chiang Yi-ching, “Rise and Fall of Han Kuo-Yu, KMT’s ‘Fallen Star’,” 
Focus Taiwan (March 6, 2020), https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202006070008 (accessed 
June 9, 2020).
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Products Market Corps, a state-owned company.48 Between 2008 and 2016, 
Taiwan was a KMT stronghold under the presidency of Ma Ying-jeou, which is 
the reason why Han could become the president of this state-owned corporation. 
Nevertheless, Han worked for this fruit and vegetable company for only five 
years. He resigned in 2017 to compete for the KMT chairmanship, but he 
was defeated by Wu Den-yih in May 2017. Han then moved to Kaohsiung, 
where he organized a KMT branch to prepare for local elections in November 
2018. From this point onward, one can say that Han had started his journey of 
becoming a rising star in the KMT. Although a “Taipei resident” for most of his 
life, Han was able to secure the Kaohsiung mayoral candidacy in early 2018. 
Han had not worked long and hard in Kaohsiung, yet the KMT nominated him 
as its mayoral candidate, a decision that soon caused much doubt.
Nevertheless, to almost the whole country’s surprise, Han won the 
Kaohsiung mayoral election in a landslide victory. He secured 53.6 percent of 
the vote in November 2018, defeating his DPP opponent, Chen Chi-mai, by a 
margin of around 8 percent. It is noteworthy that the mayorship of Kaohsiung 
had been under the DPP since 1998. Han was the first elected KMT mayor, 
making his Kaohsiung victory a significant milestone for his party.
What was the social background for Han’s victory in the Kaohsiung 
mayoral election? Han has been dubbed a populist figure because of his 
straightforward way of speaking. As reflected in the news, a Kaohsiung citizen 
said Han’s way of talking was bold and to the point. He wanted to bring about 
Kaohsiung’s transformation through “real efforts,” as captured in simple and 
pragmatic slogans. For instance, he said, “If you have things to sell, and bring 
in people to buy, then Kaohsiung will benefit big time.”49 Nevertheless, this 
straightforward way of campaigning is not convincing enough to explain Han’s 
victory. The widespread frustration with the economic setback in Kaohsiung, 
or even more so, with Taiwan’s overall economy, was the deeper reason 
explaining Han’s mayoral victory. 
From the time of Lee Teng-hui’s government in the 1990s, Taiwan’s 
economic policy was to transform the island into the Asia-Pacific’s 
regional operational center (APROC), with six sub-centers, one each for 
manufacturing, finance, telecommunications, media, maritime transportation, 
and air transportation.50 Kaohsiung was destined to be the maritime 
48 The Executive Yuan holds a 22.76 percent share, and the Taipei City Council also holds a 22.76 
percent share, hence it is a state-owned company. Regarding the structure of the company’s 
shares, see a website in Chinese, http://www.tapmc.com.taipei/Pages/About/Orgtype (accessed 
June 9, 2020). 
49 William Kung and Roger Yan, “How Kaohsiung Got Swept Up in the ‘Han Kuo-Yu Wave’,” 
Taiwan Gazette (December 16, 2018), https://www.taiwangazette.org/news/2018/12/16/the-
anti-elitist-with-a-common-touch-how-kaohsiung-residents-got-swept-up-in-the-han-kuo-yu-
wave (accessed June 9, 2020).
50 Kai Ma, “Taiwan as the Asia-Pacific Regional Operations Center: Its Significance and 
Prospects,” Nomura Foundation (September 2001), https://www.nomurafoundation.or.jp/en/
wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/20000127-28_Kai_Ma.pdf (accessed June 9, 2020).
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transportation center, an APROC plan that was suspended after Chen Shiu-
bian entered the government in 2000. The economic development blueprint of 
the Chen government was focused more on developing Taiwan into a “green 
silicon island.”51 In this blueprint, attention was directed to information and 
communications technology (ICT) development and green energy in the north 
of Taiwan. Kaohsiung, the former labor-intensive manufacturing city, has left 
behind this green developmental blueprint. Beginning in early 2000, many 
Southerners started to feel a North-South division, separated by the Jhuoshuei 
River.52 Han’s simple slogan, to reform Kaohsiung’s economy, therefore 
echoed many citizens’ long-term wishes. Indeed, a strong desire to revive the 
economy led 53.6 percent of the voters to choose Han, an unknown politician 
from Taipei. The authors view Han’s victory in the 2018 Kaohsiung mayoral 
election as more intriguing than his later decline during the presidential 
election, including his removal from the mayoral post in June 2020. 
Economic factors were a strong motivation for voters to elect Han. 
However, Han did not have local support, as he had moved to Kaohsiung only 
in early 2018, nor was there a strong party network behind him. Moreover, 
Han had never held an important position within the KMT. What produced 
Han’s fluke mayoral victory in 2018 was his populist blunt-language promises 
of bringing money into Kaohsiung, compounded by Kaohsiung’s eagerness to 
catch up with economic prosperity.
With the victory of the mayorship achieved, Han decided to run in the 
presidential election in June 2019. Thus, he took leave from the Kaohsiung 
mayorship in October 2019. In hindsight, Han’s decision to enter the 
presidential election campaign was a time bomb for his political career. 
Nevertheless, in February 2019, when the KMT was preparing to enlist Han as 
a presidential candidate, his popularity was ahead of incumbent Tsai Ing-wen’s 
by 29 percent.53 What went wrong thereafter? Han’s populist characteristics 
did not change; he still talked in “simple and straightforward language.” Why 
could he convince most voters in Kaohsiung but not convince the majority of 
Taiwan’s voters?
This essay proposes two likely reasons. First, as a presidential candidate, 
Han needed to face the unavoidable China factor, which became the sore 
point of his campaign and, to a larger extent, a significant vulnerability in 
the KMT’s overall strategy. The China factor has been an election sticking 
51 Christopher R. Hughes and Gudrun Wacker, China and the Internet: Politics of the Digital Leap 
Forward (London: Routledge, 2003).
52 Pat Gao, “Taiwan’s Marginalized South,” Taiwan Today (November 1, 2007), https://
taiwantoday.tw/print.php?unit=12,20,29,33,35,45&post=22184 (accessed June 9, 2020).
53 Samson Ellis, “Odds Look Long for Taiwan’s China-Friendly Presidential Contender,” 
Bloomberg.Com (December 30, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-12-31/
odds-lengthen-for-taiwan-s-china-friendly-presidential-contender (accessed June 9, 2020).
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point since the 1995-1996 cross-Strait missile crisis.54 Since the early 2000s, 
following China’s accumulation of much more economic power, the Beijing 
government has tried to win over Taiwanese people’s hearts and minds through 
various economic means, including by purchasing fruit, agricultural products, 
and fish.55 Nevertheless, none of these deliberate economic state-crafts has 
helped gain more support from Taiwanese society for a closer cross-Strait 
relationship. Ma’s government suffered from closer economic collaboration 
with China, one of the major reasons why the KMT lost the presidential 
election in 2016.56 These past but still lingering Taiwanese memories of China 
influenced Taiwanese voters’ preferences in choosing presidential candidates 
in 2020. Another external condition was the Hong Kong protest, started in June 
2019, and its ongoing impact at the moment of writing, and China’s proposal 
of a national security law in late May 2020.57
Second, as a presidential candidate, Han’s talks and even the presidential 
debate were thoroughly scrutinized by society. Unfortunately, the monitors 
were not the media but civil groups, which will be addressed later in 
this analysis. 
Han’s Rise and Fall with the Media
This section of the essay addresses the Han wave and its relationship to the 
media. It connects what has been mentioned above-the disproportionate 
coverage and misinformation of commercial broadcasting from CTiTV during 
Han’s electoral campaign. According to this study’s analysis, the Han wave 
was made partly possible by commercial media, especially the pro-Han CTiTV, 
which nurtured online fan clubs. Additionally, this section shows how civil 
society adopted strategies to counter media populism, especially by exerting 
pressure on regulators to curb CTiTV’s delivery of misinformation. 
As Han attracted a pro-Blue audience, the populist leader had formed 
symbiotic relations with the pro-Blue media, especially CTiTV. According to 
the literature on media and populism, populist figures are good for commercial 
54 Robert S. Ross, “The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use 
of Force,” International Security 25, no. 2 (2000): 87-123.
55 Chi-hung Wei, “China’s Economic Offensive and Taiwan’s Defensive Measures: Cross-Strait 
Fruit Trade, 2005-2008,” China Quarterly 215 (September 2013): 641-662; Stan Hok-wui 
Wong and Nicole Wu, “Can Beijing Buy Taiwan? An Empirical Assessment of Beijing’s 
Agricultural Trade Concessions to Taiwan,” Journal of Contemporary China 25, no. 99 (May 3, 
2016): 353-371; and Shu Keng, Jean Yu-Chen Tseng, and Qiang Yu, “The Strengths of China’s 
Charm Offensive: Changes in the Political Landscape of a Southern Taiwan Town under Attack 
from Chinese Economic Power,” China Quarterly 232 (December 2017): 956-981.
56 Ming-sho Ho, “Occupy Congress in Taiwan: Political Opportunity, Threat, and the Sunflower 
Movement,” Journal of East Asian Studies 15, no. 1 (April 2015): 69.
57 Chung, “Taiwan Opposition Candidate Removed as Mayor in Recall Vote.”
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media because of their inherent characteristics-they are emotional, 
confrontational, and atypical.58
In this case study of populism, Han reflected conservative values-to 
restore the glory of the old days, to show no tolerance for political protest, and 
to forge close economic ties with China. He gained support from the pro-Blue 
camp, about 30 percent of the population. Also, as highlighted in previous 
sections, as a populist figure, Han was noted for his straightforward way of 
speaking, bold remarks, and simple slogans; these populist characteristics met 
the needs of commercial media. 
Further, Han’s claim of the need to strengthen economic ties with China 
resonated with the inclinations of CTiTV’s owner, who had interests in China 
and toed the pro-CCP line. During the Kaohsiung mayoral election, CTiTV 
devoted more time to a single politician than pro-Green news channels. 
On the one hand-according to a commissioned NCC study, which took 
place between November 17, 2018, and November 23, 2018-62 percent of 
CTiTV news coverage time was centered on the KMT presidential candidate, 
Han Kuo-yu. On the other hand, the channel gave only 7 percent of its 
coverage time to the DPP candidate, Chen Chi-mai. In contrast, there was more 
balance among pro-DPP news channels. Formosa TV, for instance, devoted 20 
percent to Chen and 9 percent to Han. Era TV devoted 19 percent to Chen and 
11 percent to Han. Sanli devoted even more news time (24 percent) to Han 
than to Chen (18 percent).59 In promoting Han, CTiTV’s rating climbed to the 
top. CTiTV was in third place for three months before the Kaohsiung mayoral 
election, second place one month before the election, and, finally, in first place 
on polling day. When Han won the election, CTiTV also won in the ratings 
race because of its huge coverage of Han.60
The pro-Blue news channels all gave Han coverage but were relatively 
more balanced than CTiTV. Because of market pressure, the former had to 
follow the Han wave. For example, TVBS had been in first place in terms of 
ratings but eventually fell to second. Thus, it had to adjust its policy due to 
market pressure.61
The pro-Han channels further nurtured fan groups. Members of the 
audience who watched CTiTV formed fan clubs. Instead of watching news 
programs passively, they actively formed echo chambers, sharing common 
58 Gianpietro Mazzoleni, “Mediatization and Political Populism,” in Mediatization of 
Politics: Understanding the Transformation of Western Democracies, ed. Frank Esser and 
Jesper Strömbäck (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2014), pp. 42-56, https://www.springer.
com/gb/book/9781137275837 (accessed March 5, 2020).
59 National Communications Commission, “Content Analysis of Television News Coverage for 
the 2018 Local Election in Taiwan.”
60 “Reception Analysis of the 2018 Election Season, Kaibro Weekly Report,” Carat Media 
Weekly: Digital Think Tank (November 29, 2018), https://twncarat.wordpress.com/2018/11/30/ 
(accessed March 5, 2021).
61 TVBS senior reporter, interviewed by Lihyun Lin, Taipei, March 11, 2019.
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values and worldviews. Some joined Han’s own official Facebook fan page, 
as Han himself had utilized streams carried live on social media. Some 
supporters established pro-Han clubs themselves.62 Still others joined both; 
they disseminated pro-Han messages, including programs made by CTiTV. 
They also created disinformation and composite pictures. Some of these clubs 
remained active and supportive of CTiTV, even after the recession of the 
Han wave. 
The above factors contributed to the spread of the Han wave by the end of 
2018. However, Taiwan’s civil society began to fight against media populism 
in early 2019. An important contextual factor was the Anti-Extradition Law 
Amendment Bill (反送中) movement in Hong Kong in early 2019. As the 
Beijing government imposed tight control of Hong Kong, Taiwanese NGO 
groups became worried about Han’s pro-China policies, especially right after 
the newly elected Han went to Hong Kong to meet the CCP’s leader. 
The Apple Media Group, which was based in Hong Kong, began to 
investigate Han’s fortunes. This group supported Hong Kong’s democratic 
movement and opposed the CCP’s authoritarian rule. After Han declared 
his candidacy for the 2020 presidential election, the Apple Media Group’s 
Next Weekly discovered that Han’s family ran an illegal business, made 
windfall profits, and owned huge properties (mansions and a country house).63 
Participants on pro-Green news channels cast doubts concerning Han’s claims 
that he spoke for deprived people. They were also concerned about pro-Han 
misinformation delivered by pro-Han media, such as CTiTV.
Citizens and nongovernmental groups began to take action against the 
spread of populism, demanding that regulators such as the NCC curb 
misinformation delivered by CTiTV. The NCC received seventy-two 
complaints about television service in 2017. The number of complaints 
grew by 13.3 times, to 962 in 2019.64 These complaints were against pro-
Han channels, charging that these networks produced false news stories 
and violated professional norms in devoting disproportionate coverage to 
Han’s campaign.
In response to these complaints, the NCC launched program review 
committees to consider such programs and decide whether news channels had 
violated regulations. According to article 27 of the Satellite Broadcasting Act, 
the produced and broadcasted news should not violate the principles of fact 
verification and should pay attention to the principles of fairness. Nevertheless, 
62 See, for example, the Facebook fan page, “Supporting Han’s Presidential Campaign,”  which 
has 70,000 members, https://www.facebook.com/groups/627281404381582 (accessed June 18, 
2020).
63 Keoni Everington, “Han’s Wife in Hot Water for Illegal ‘Luxury Farmhouse’ in W. Taiwan,” 
Taiwan News (July 12, 2019), https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3743621 (accessed 
June 18, 2020).
64 National Communications Commission, “NCC’s Decision to Reject License Renewal for 
CTiTV,” National Communications Commission (November 18, 2020), https://www.ncc.gov.
tw/chinese/news_detail.aspx?site_content_sn=8&sn_f=45332 (accessed March 3, 2021).
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CTiTV violated these regulations in its coverage of Han.65 The number of 
violations of broadcasting laws and penalties also increased.
Some NGO groups, together with a Power Party legislator, 
Huang Kuo-chang, launched an anti-Red media rally, demanding that the 
NCC take effective action to regulate the dissemination of Red media. The 
organizers had been opposed to pro-China Taiwanese media that constantly 
promoted Beijing’s political propaganda and disseminated disinformation. The 
rally targeted the Want Want China Times Media Group, accusing its owner, 
Tsai Eng-ming, of liaising with the Chinese government. Huang, an important 
figure in the 2012 campaign against media monopoly, argued that the NCC 
renewed the license of CTiTV in 2014 with four requirements. One stipulation 
was that CTiTV must establish an ombudsman system within three months. 
Because CTiTV had failed to meet this requirement, it was argued that the 
NCC should revoke its license immediately. However, the NCC did not revoke 
the license because there was no ground to do so under this condition. Instead, 
the NCC only issued a fine of NT$500,000 (US$17,241) and urged CTiTV to 
deliver on its promises in the next renewal of its license. 
How Media Tycoons Hijack Press Freedom
After the Han wave dissolved on November 18, 2020, the NCC refused to 
renew the license of CTiTV. Earlier, on August 21, the external committee 
disapproved CTiTV’s application because the outlet had continued to breach 
media regulations and had failed to fulfill its promise to implement internal 
quality control. According to the NCC’s regulations regarding media content, 
the public may file complaints about content and an independent content review 
committee then reviews the relevant programs. The committee members 
decide whether content is in violation of regulations. In 2018, after receiving 
numerous complaints, the NCC ruled that ten CTiTV stories had violated fact-
checking principles required by the satellite broadcasting law. The NCC fined 
the news agency NT$600,000 for again violating article 27. By the end of 2020, 
CTiTV had been fined a total of NT$11.53 million (US$397,586) for twenty-
five breaches of media regulations, ranging from biased reporting to spreading 
misinformation-significantly more violations than other news channels. 
Considering the suggestions made by the external committee and the 
evidence that CTiTV had failed to deliver on its promises, the NCC finally 
decided not to renew CTiTV’s license. The NCC pointed out that CTiTV had 
continued to violate regulations since the previous license period. In 2014, the 
NCC had approved license renewal with the proviso that CTiTV strengthen 
its internal control. There was hope that, with improved internal mechanisms, 
65 Shelley Shan, “NCC Fines CtiTV NT$1.6m for Fact-Checking Failures,” Taipei Times (July 25, 
2019), https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2019/07/25/2003719299 (accessed 
December 9, 2020).
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CTiTV would reduce the number of its regulatory breaches. However, CTiTV’s 
internal control failed to function. Further, based on evidence the commission 
had collected at an administrative hearing on October 26, 2020-and a meeting 
between NCC commissioners and CTiTV on November 4, 2020-the NCC 
identified the fundamental problem as the channel’s largest shareholder, Want 
Want China Times Media Group founder Tsai Eng-ming, who had intervened 
directly and indirectly in the news production process. Furthermore, the 
channel’s managers admitted that, at the height of the Han wave, Tsai’s special 
assistant, Chiu Chia-yu (邱佳瑜), had directly supervised a news department 
that did not have a full-time managing director for five months in 2018. 
According to the NCC, as long as the owner’s influence existed internally, 
the internal control mechanism of CTiTV would fail to function. The NCC 
discovered that CTiTV had failed to improve its internal control mechanisms 
to reduce the number of breaches to avoid daily intervention from the owner. 
The NCC ruled that CTiTV was unable to improve its internal mechanisms 
to reduce breach occurrences. Therefore, it would not be able to carry out 
CTiTV’s public promise.66
The Want Want Media Group used press freedom to shield the channel 
against the NCC’s ruling. CTiTV, in its announcement, called the day of the 
ruling “the darkest” for freedom of press and speech since the end of martial 
law in 1987.67 Meanwhile, Tsai Eng-ming aired his grievances on Facebook, 
saying there was political manipulation against CTiTV’s telling the truth. The 
next day, splashed across the front page of China Times were two characters, 
無恥, meaning “shameless,” in an attack against the NCC that portrayed it as 
the DPP government’s vehicle to suppress press freedom. 
The pro-Blue camp also opposed the NCC decision, using freedom of the 
press as a foil against the NCC. The KMT opposed the decision, describing it as 
having a “chilling effect” and endangering press freedom. Han even compared 
the NCC’s seven commissioners to the seven dwarfs who served Snow White, 
the DPP leader, Tsai Ing-Wen.68 In contrast, media scholars argued that license 
holders should fulfill social responsibilities. Other researchers pointed out that, 
while license holders had been unable to improve their internal controls, news 
quality, and freedom from owners, the NCC had made no other suggestions to 
help television stations.69
66 National Communications Commission, “The National Communications Commission Decides 
to Reject the Renewal Application for the ‘Zhongtian News Channel’s’ Weiguang Business 
License” (November 18, 2020), https://www.ncc.gov.tw/chinese/chinese/news_detail.
aspx?site_content_sn=8&sn_f=45332 (accessed March 5, 2021).
67 T. N. L. Staff, “Taiwan Shuts Down Pro-China CTi News,” News Lens International Edition 
(November 19, 2020), https://international.thenewslens.com/article/143510 (accessed 
March 5, 2021).
68 Wang Zixuan, “Han Kuo Yu Is Angry, Blamed the NCC’s Commissioners as ‘Seven Dwarfs,’ 
within Half Hour More Than 150,000 Thumbs Up on Han’s Facebook Page,” China Times 
News (November 18, 2020), https://www.chinatimes.com/realtimenews/20201118004018-
260407?chdtv (accessed March 5, 2021).
69 T.N.L. Staff, “Taiwan Shuts Down Pro-China CTi News.”
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NGO groups supported the government’s decision. For example, 
Reporters Without Borders issued a statement saying that the rejection did not 
violate press freedom because freedom of the press does not entail absence of 
oversight.70 It encouraged democratic institutions to use mechanisms to ensure 
journalistic integrity and editorial freedom. Furthermore, it expected the NCC 
to review cases based on whether the application review was legitimate, 
adding that “rejecting a license renewal” is an extreme method. Therefore, 
the NCC needed to prove its rationale and apply the same standards to other 
application reviews. 
However, since CTiTV never showed the side of the argument presented 
by Reporters Without Borders, audiences believed that the DPP used the NCC 
as a tool to suppress press freedom. Thus, dozens of CTiTV News supporters 
rallied outside the NCC to protest the commissioners’ decision not to renew 
the news channel’s license. Following Tsia Eng-ming’s words, they called the 
decision political. Hence, they sprayed red paint over a DPP flag and urged 
public members to defend freedom of speech and press freedom.71
Discussion and Conclusion 
The previous sections of the essay present three main arguments, based on the 
unfolding events of CTiTV as they relate to the rise and fall of the populist 
figure, Han Kuo-yu, from 2014 until the time of writing. The first argument 
regarding the government’s regulation of mass media is specifically related to 
television channels. Connecting this to the literature review, the question is, 
therefore, not whether the government should intervene, but how.72 The essay 
has considered the media, specifically focusing on television channels. The 
argument is that television carries more social responsibility to serve the public 
interest than other media, as it is the most influential media source nowadays. 
A recent example of a democratic government’s revocation of a television 
channel’s license was on February 4, 2021, when Ofcom, the governmental 
regulator of communication services in the United Kingdom, revoked the 
license of the China Global Television Network (CGTN).73 This provided the 
basis of the study’s first argument. 
The second argument concerns how populism thrives with media’s 
promotion. Media owners may consider private interests rather than public 
70 Kuan-ting et al., “Non-Renewal of CTi News License Regrettable: RSF.”
71 Shelley Shan and Jason Pan, “Pan-Blue Groups Protest CTi News Action,” Taipei Times 
(October 22, 2020), https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2020/10/22/200374 
5582 (accessed December 8, 2020).
72 McQuail, Media Performance, and Napoli, Foundations of Communications Policy.
73 “Ofcom Revokes CGTN’s License to Broadcast in the UK,” Ofcom (February 4, 2021), https://
ww.ofcom.org.uk/about-ofcom/latest/media/media-releases/2021/ofcom-revokes-cgtn-licence-
to-broadcast-in-uk (accessed March 5, 2021).
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interests. In this case, their right to do so resonates with the public in most 
democratic societies. This is because media owners in democracies are not 
states; but whether their code of conduct will reflect social responsibility or their 
own private interests is difficult to predict or to counterbalance. This argument 
is also connected to media populism. In the Taiwan case, certain media owners 
(e.g., Tsai Eng-ming at CTiTV), promoted specific populist figures (e.g., KMT 
candidate, Han Kuo-yu). Moreover, CTiTV brazenly and repeatedly violated 
broadcasting regulations, with more violations of regulations and more 
penalties than other news channels. Between December 2014 and December 
2020, CTiTV had twenty-five violations, with the penalty of NT$11.53 million 
(US$397,586), followed by Sanli News channel with eighteen violations and 
the penalty of NT$ 4 million (US$137,931), EBC News channel with twelve 
violations and the penalty of NT$ 2.93 million (US$101,034), and TVBS 
News with eleven violations and the penalty of NT$ 2 million (US$68,965).74
There are two threads of reflection, here: First, CTiTV initiated bombastic 
reporting on Han, whereas other TV channels provided “follow-up” to 
explain the “supply and demand” phenomenon, described in the theoretical 
and conceptual framework regarding the media and public interest. However, 
because corporate media owners report populist news for commercial interest, 
the study asked whether the government should intervene. That said, the 
larger and more significant question is not whether the government should 
intervene but how it should do so. This second reflection centers on the party 
color of the media owner and the populist figure. The essay explained the 
background of CTiTV and indicated the owner Tsai’s investment interest 
in China. Hence, to serve his interest, China Times and CTiTV became 
convenient tools at his disposal.75 However, because the populist figure Han 
became a powerful advocate for CTiTV’s Tsai, there is a lingering question 
concerning government intervention-and the answer, here, is negative. Any 
media owner has the right to use the media outlet to pursue personal interests. 
That said, the media owner’s interests do not necessarily serve the public 
interest. Indeed, more often than not, media owners use the media as tools to 
serve their own interests. Nevertheless, governmental regulator organizations 
-such as the NCC-should make certain there is a diverse and competitive 
media environment. A diverse media environment means that, if a particular 
media report contains different political views from those of the ruling 
government, they should not be forbidden. Thus, the NCC is committed to 
74 The figures are calculations from “Monthly Records of NCC’s Sanctions on Satellite Channels,” 
https://www.ncc.gov.tw/chinese/gradation.aspx?site_content_sn=575 (accessed March 3, 
2021).
75 Lihyun Lin and Chun-Yi Lee, “When Business Met Politics: The Case of Want Want, a Different 
Type of Media Capital in Taiwan,” China Perspectives, no. 2 (June 1, 2017): 37-46.
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protecting the interests of consumers, not just those of the ruling government, 
as indicated on its official website.76
The third argument-addressed in the previous section-indicates how civil 
society implemented fact-checking. A bigger question to ask, however, is what 
exactly is fake news? In this case study, it was shown that CTiTV’s broadcasting 
about Han was cited many times for false information between 2014 and 2020. 
Nevertheless, Han supporters might consider all these reports fake or having 
been manufactured by the DPP. Although CTiTV held a television license, 
Han’s supporters also had strong netizen support from Facebook and Line, 
as indicated in the essay’s data. All social media companies select the news 
to feed to their readers, which causes intensified division within the public. 
As Anne Schulz et al. proposed, social identity is the backbone for populists 
and their specific rhetorical delivery style.77 Concurring with this assertion, 
this essay has argued that Han’s supporters would not accept that CTiTV’s 
coverage was fake because they socially identified with the content of CTiTV’s 
broadcasts. However, this argument deserves further research. 
In the fields of media and political studies, our presented case might not 
be encouraging. In this study, the authors have temporarily concluded that the 
role of the media in a young democracy, as in the case of Taiwan, is one of 
the crucial factors in promoting the rise of populism. The concept of media 
populism thus explains the rise of populism in Taiwan. This is so because 
the media environment in Taiwan has been partisan and commercialized into 
tabloid-style journalism. This commercial media landscape, which is fond of 
sensationalism and a simplified worldview, has been a hotbed for populism and 
a battleground for Han “as a hero and savior for Taiwan’s future.” 
CTiTV is a media company that violated many regulations established 
by the NCC. In 2014, the NCC was about to suspend CTiTV’s broadcasting 
license. However, in consideration of “press freedom,” the NCC extended 
CTiTV’s license in the same year. In 2020, the NCC internal committee 
supported the external committee’s decision. It suspended CTiTV’s 
broadcasting license. According to the NCC, the decision was not because 
of CTiTV’s party color. The NCC issued the ruling because CTiTV had 
failed to improve internal control mechanisms, as promised while renewing 
its license in 2014. This failure of CTiTV resulted in regulation violations, 
especially regarding inaccurate content and undue impartiality, along with an 
unreasonable amount of election coverage focused on only a single candidate-
Han Kuo-yu. Still, Chung Tien’s supporters argued that the NCC should not 
76 About the NCC: “Introduction of the National Communications Commission,” National 
Communications Commission, https://www.ncc.gov.tw/english/content.aspx?site_content_
sn=284&is_history=0 (accessed April 23, 2021).
77 Anne Schulz, Werner Wirth, and Philipp Müller, “We Are the People and You Are Fake News: A 
Social Identity Approach to Populist Citizens’ False Consensus and Hostile Media Perceptions,” 
Communication Research 47, no. 2 (March 1, 2020): 201-226.
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intervene in CTiTV’s Han coverage because the channel should have the 
freedom to decide its editorial policy.78 Other media academics supported 
the NCC’s decision. They argued that nonrenewal of CTiTV’s news channel 
license did not go against press freedom. This is because CTiTV had violated 
journalistic professionalism by neglecting fact-checking and due impartiality. 
It also lacked control mechanisms and violated regulations continuously.79
The NCC fulfilled its responsibility as a regulator. However, the public 
perceived this act as a partisan intervention. In many ways, the protest 
against the NCC’s decision-along with threats against committee members 
and an act of self-immolation-indicates an even more serious issue within 
Taiwanese society: the misunderstanding or hijacking of the very meaning of 
press freedom. 
One can see such trends blossoming on digital social media platforms and 
feeds to citizens of selected news, creating even larger camps among different 
opinion groups. CTiTV and Han’s case illustrates the situation in only Taiwan. 
In many democratic countries, this phenomenon has caught the attention of 
scholars and governments, raising grave concern. Bridging the opinions of 
different online media groups is a challenge for most democratic governments 
to consider. 
78 Chin Chugo, “The NCC Has Abandoned the Value of Impartiality,” China Times 
(November 11, 2020), https://www.chinatimes.com/opinion/20201110005385-262104?chdtv 
(accessed February 1, 2021). 
79 Loa Chi, “Professor of National Taiwan University Says There Are Three Keys for NCC’s 
Decision,” Liberty Times (November 18, 2020), sec. Life, https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/life/
breakingnews/3355372 (accessed February 1, 2021).
